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We study the determinants of the size of the core in the school choice problem using three
years of data from a large higher education application clearinghouse. The clearinghouse
uses a variation of the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to assign applicants to
slots in Finnish polytechnics. If the core is large, switching to a student-optimal stable
mechanism (SOSM) could yield large improvements for applicants at a cost to schools.
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in Finnish polytechnic assignments. We show that the similarity of COSM and SOSM
matchings is due to correlated school priorities, differing numbers of students and slots,
and to students only applying to a small number of programs each. Because these
properties are common to other higher education school choice problems, our conclusions
are likely to generalize. In spite of the fact that Finnish polytechnics jointly only accept a
third of applicants, accepted applicants' average matriculation exam grades are not much
better than those of the median applicant. We attribute this to the low effective number of
programs applied to, and suggest that details in the design of the application process
affect the trade-off in match quality.
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1 Introduction
The school choice problem is the problem of allocating applicants (students)
to indivisible slots in programs (schools) without using money. A large part
of the school choice literature has focused on the theoretical properties of the
different matching algorithms and on improvements to realized matchings. We
know much less about how matching algorithms compare in practice, especially
in large, real-world applications.
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that in a marriage market, where each
agent wants to find a pair, with strict preferences there always exists a sta-
ble matching, i.e. the size of the core is at least one. Furthermore, one can
generally find many different stable matchings in a marriage market, with the
man-optimal and women-optimal stable matching as extreme cases. In a school
choice problem, where schools can accept more than one student, these two ex-
treme matchings are the college-optimal and the student-optimal stable match-
ing, respectively produced by the College-Optimal Stable Mechanism (COSM)
and the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism (SOSM).1 Applicants are matched
to Finnish polytechnic programs by a variation of COSM. The use of a college-
optimal mechanism naturally poses the question whether the core is large and
applicants’ outcomes could be improved by using a student-optimal mechanism
instead, or whether the core is small and the two extreme matchings are similar
to each other.
Theoretical findings on the expected size of the core are mixed. Pittel (1989)
showed that the size of the core is growing with market size when the market is
balanced and preferences are randomly drawn. Eeckhout (2000), Clark (2006),
Salonen and Salonen (2018), and Akahoshi (2014) formulate conditions on pref-
erence domains such that the core is guaranteed to be a singleton, but these
conditions are so restrictive that they seem unlikely to hold in practice2. On
the other hand, when submitted Rank Ordered Lists (ROLs) are shortened, for
example because of nonzero marginal application costs or because of adminis-
trative restrictions, the size of the core converges to an upper bound (Roth and
Peranson, 1999). Likewise, when the preferences of the agents are correlated
the size of the core has an upper bound (Holzman and Samet, 2014). Ashlagi
et al. (2017) showed that the core can shrink substantially by even a slight un-
balancedness in a marriage market, i.e. when the number of men and women on
the market are only slightly unequal. Empirical studies using real matching data
on the differences between student- and college-optimal stable matchings have
been carried out by Colenbrander (1996a,b), Peranson and Randlett (1995), and
Roth and Peranson (1999). All of these studies were based on small datasets,
and found little or no difference between the two extreme stable matchings.
We add to the literature by studying the size of the core and its determinants
in a large higher education market. We find that the core is either a singleton or
very small for each of the three years which our data cover. We further find that
this is the case because in Finnish polytechnic applications, i) program priorities
1The algorithms are described in Appendix A.
2Eeckhout shows that the core is a singleton when the preferences on both sides of the
market satisfy single-peakedness. Clark shows the same result for no-crossing property on
preferences. This condition is also known as the single-crossing property. Salonen and Salonen
(2018) show that these properties induce a singleton core in college admission problems.
Akahoshi introduces an acyclicity condition and a capacity based condition.
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are correlated, ii) the number of applicants vastly outnumbers the number of
slots, and iii) applicants apply to a very small average number of programs.
We show that removing any single one of these empirical features from the
clearing house data is insufficient to create a sizable core, and that adding a
single one of these empirical feature to a simulated data set designed to create
large differences between the COSM and SOSM matchings is sufficient to dra-
matically reduce the size of the core. Since these features are common to other
education markets, the similarity of COSM and SOSM matchings is likely to be
a general property in these markets.
Yet, when the core is a singleton, match quality in terms of average ranks
of their matched pairs differs for applicants and schools. Majority of accepted
applicants get matched to their most preferred program while the programs on
average get matched with middle tier students when ranks are based on the
field specific grade priorities. We attribute this phenomenon as a consequence
of short ROLs listed by students.
In the next section we describe the institutional background of school choice
in Finnish higher education. We introduce the data in Section 3 and the stan-
dard school choice model in Section 4. In Section 5 we show the effect of ROL
restrictions on the size of the core, convergence of the two extreme matchings,
and changes in average ranks. Our empirical results are shown in Section 6. We
discuss the implications of our results in Section 7. Finally the descriptions of
the algorithms and additional tables can be found in Appendix A.
2 Institutional Background
Finnish higher education is provided by polytechnics and universities, with stu-
dents typically graduating with a Bachelor’s degree from the former, and with
a Master’s from the latter. Some higher education programs have secondary
enrollment rounds, but large majority of applicants enroll in August or Septem-
ber at the end of an application process which starts in March. Since university
applications are handled in a decentralized manner, in this paper we concentrate
on the larger group of polytechnic applicants, whose applications were processed
through a centralized clearing house.
The application process starts in March when applicants can rank up to four
programs in order of their preference. Entry exams are mostly held in May or
June. Program priorities are represented by a composite score based on the stu-
dent’s matriculation grades, his entry exam result, and other program specific
factors e.g. working experience in a relevant field, with extra points awarded
for the first listed choice. Programs in different fields weight the different ma-
triculation exam subjects differently, but programs within the same fields tend
to use the same weights, and typically share a common entry exam as well.
Though entry exams play an important role in acceptance decisions, ap-
plicants must choose where to apply before learning their entry exam results.
Applicants do however receive preliminary matriculation exam grades, with the
final grades published in May. Applicants also have access to previous years’
composite score cut-offs, and to the different programs’ selection criteria.
After the entry exams have been graded, applicants are matched to programs
through a centrally run COSM variation, receiving either an offer from a single
program, or no offer at all. Applicants then either accept this offer, or reject
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Table 1: Number of programs in each field and year
field 2011 2012 2013
pedagogy 7 7 7
fine arts and culture 62 59 48
agriculture, forestry and the environment 26 25 16
business information systems 15 14 13
social sciences and business administration 39 40 35
health and social care 121 124 123
engineering 137 131 127
tourism 33 32 26
total 440 432 395
it. A second round of offers is sent out by the programs themselves to make
up for first-round rejections. Because the second round is decentralized, we
concentrate on the first round in our analysis.
3 Data
We have data covering all applications to Finnish polytechnics that were made
through the centralized clearing mechanism during the fall application rounds of
years 2011, 2012, and 2013. For each applicant, the data contain the applicant’s
ROLs, i.e. the programs applied to in order of preference. For each of these
applications, it also includes matriculation exam grades, entry exam scores, and
the composite application score. We also have the final state of the actual
matching algorithm, indicating which applicants received offers, and which did
not.
Regrettably, we do not have information on the program identifiers and
quota used in the actual application algorithm. We therefore use combinations
of polytechnic name and program name as proxies of program identifiers and
the number of simultaneous offers made by each program as a proxy for pro-
gram quota. We can replicate about 98% of application decisions by applying
a standard COSM algorithm to the composite scores. Throughout the paper,
we will use our simulated COSM matching as the benchmark rather than the
actual outcome of the matching.
Table 1 shows the number of programs in each field of study in each of the
three years we have data. Programs in the fields of health, social care, and
engineering jointly make up more than half of the programs. Table 2 contains
information on the number of applicants, applications and slots in each appli-
cation year. The central clearing house handles more than 50 000 applicants
to Finnish polytechnics each year, with an average of between two and three
applications per applicant. Only about 38% of applicants apply to the maxi-
mum number of four programs. The number of applicants vastly outnumbers
the number of slots, with the number of slots available per applicant being ap-
proximately 0.31. The last column shows the average probability of receiving a
study slot offer conditional on the number of programs applied to. Offer proba-
bilities are only marginally larger for applicants who apply to larger number of
programs, and few applicants are admitted to their fourth listed program.
Correlated preferences have been shown to be important in determining the
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Table 2: Application statistics
2011 2012 2013
programs 440 432 395
applicants 50894 50979 52665
applications 140917 140485 142723
slots 16655 16425 15210
number of programs applied to P
1 10362 10508 11458 28.79%
2 10089 10308 11299 30.65%
3 11395 11291 10965 31.78%
4 19048 18872 18943 32.75%
accepted to fourth preference 496 466 405
Application statistics for the fall application rounds of 2011, 2012 and 2013. Column P shows
the offer probability conditional on number programs applied to averaged over the three years
size of the core. In a higher education setting, it seems natural that program
priorities would be correlated with each other. An applicant who is desirable to
one program, is likely to be desirable to another program as well. In our data,
the mean pairwise correlation between programs’ rankings of applicants’ GPA
is approximately 0.86. Part of this is because rankings are correlated across
fields, part is because different programs with the same fields rank applicants
identically. When we simulate rankings to be uncorrelated across fields, but
perfectly correlated within them, the mean pairwise correlation is only 0.21.
This shows that the overall correlation is largely driven by a correlation of
priorities across fields.
Preferences can also be correlated between applicants, but since applicants
only apply to up to four programs in our data, these correlations are hard to
measure, and we refrain from quantifying them explicitly. We do however note
that in spite of the fact that less than a third of the applicants receive an offer,
across the grade distribution applicants apply to programs that are substantially
harder for them to get in to than the median program. This suggests a positive
correlation of preferences across applicants.
Applicants further fail to list safe choices. Applicants of all grades have a
range of programs available to them that would double their offer probabilities
compared to the mean offer probability of their actual application portfolio.
Moreover, 62% of applicants fail to fill out all four programs on their applica-
tion. Among those 62%, the second and third choices are not particularly safe
either. Though these applicants could have added a safe fourth program in their
application at low marginal cost, they did not.
A third type of correlation exists between program and applicant preferences,
and this cross-correlation can also affect the size of the core. In the context
of higher education applications, a positive cross-correlation can be seen as
applicants preferring programs in which they have a comparative advantage.
Somewhat surprisingly however, in our data applicants do not apply to programs
in which they have unusually high grades, suggesting that the cross-correlation
between preferences is not a contributing factor to a small observed core size in
our data.
There is a concern that Finnish polytechnics applicants may strategize, es-
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pecially since bonus points are awarded for the highest listed program, ties are
broken based on ROLs, and the matching algorithm in use is COSM. Applicants
however i) fail to apply to the maximum of four programs, ii) fail to list a safe
option among the programs they apply to, and iii) fail to apply to programs
in which they hold a comparative advantage, suggesting that many applicants
genuinely prefer staying unmatched to being matched to a different program,
and that their strategizing is not sophisticated. Hence, in our simulations we
assume that the preferences are reported truthfully. We furthermore carry out a
series of robustness checks where we replace applicant preferences by randomly
drawn ones in Appendix A. The results remain substantially similar.
4 Model and methods
The school choice model consists of finite set of applicants s ∈ S and finite set
of programs c ∈ C. Each program c has a quota of qc > 0. Applicants have
strict preferences over the set of programs and demand a single indivisible study
slot. If the preferences of an applicant s are ≺s: c, ..., s, ..., c′, then applicant s
prefers program c to all other programs and s prefers to be unmatched rather
than given a study slot in program c′. Priorities of the programs are defined
in the same way except programs demand at most their quota amount qc of
applicants and only consider applicants that applied there.
We denote the matching function by µ : S → C ∪S. Function µ matches an
agent to himself or to an agent from the other set. An applicant is matched to
himself when µ(s) = s and an applicant is matched to a program if µ(s) = c.
An algorithm produces a matching µ where i) an agent is matched to himself,
or ii) an applicant s is matched to program c under µ and the set of applicants
matched to program c includes applicant s as well under µ. We assume that
applicants only care about being matched to a program and not about which
slot in that program they are placed in. Furthermore, we assume that priorities
of the programs are responsive (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1992, p. 128). That
is, programs’ priorities over different matchings corresponds to priorities over
applicants, not groups of applicants.
A matching µ is individually rational if no agent is matched to an unac-
ceptable counterpart, that is, for all s ∈ S and c ∈ C it holds that µ(s) 6= c
if i) c ≺s s, ii) s ≺c ∅, or iii) s is acceptable to c but has no free capacity.
A blocking pair (s, c′) can be formed when under some algorithm applicant s
and program c′ are not matched, but both prefer each other to their matched
pairs: µ(s) ≺s c′ and s′ ≺c′ s such that µ(s′) = c′ holds3. An algorithm satisfies
stability, if participating in the algorithm is individually rational and there are
no blocking pairs. An algorithm is strategy-proof if there is no incentive for
the agents to misrepresent their true preferences. A matching produced by an
algorithm is Pareto-efficient if no improvements to the matching can be made
without making an applicant worse off.
We use the notation S′ as the subset of applicants that are matched with a
program in a stable matching. That is, s ∈ S′ if µ(s) = c. We say a program
c is matched with rank rc = rµ(s) applicants under an algorithm that produces
µ, where s ∈ S′. If a program µ(s) is matched with the first and the third
3We use notation where program c′ ∈ C is some other program than c ∈ C. Likewise
applicant s′ ∈ S is some other applicant than s ∈ S.
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applicants on its list of priorities the rank rc equals two. Similarly, an applicant
s has rank rs = 1 if he is matched to his most preferred program.
In the Finnish polytechnic clearing house, programs only express exact pri-
orities over actual applicants. Realizations of rc therefore become dependent
on which applicants choose to apply to the individual program, and is bounded
by the number of applicants to that program. Since field-specific matriculation
grade averages are available for applicants to all programs, where relevant we
therefore also report averages of rc as defined on applicant grades. These can
be seen as proxies of match quality from the programs’ perspective, and are
more easily generalizable to other markets. Since we want average ranks to be
invariant to the aggregation level of schools, we weight by applicant rather than
by program throughout.
As Irving and Leather (1986) demonstrated, calculating the size of the core
is NP-hard. We therefore follow Roth and Peranson (1999) and Holzman and
Samet (2014), and compare the extreme COSM and SOSM matchings to each
other. We do this by looking at the number of applicants allocated differently,
as well as the average ranks of agents under COSM and SOSM.
5 ROL restrictions and the size of the core
Next we illustrate how ROL restrictions reduce the size of the core, converge the
two extreme matchings, and affect average ranks. By construction, the length
of ROL for an applicant in an unrestricted case is the size of the set of programs
|C| when all programs are acceptable. If the length of ROLs are restricted by
some number n the applicant can apply to at most |C| − n programs.
To demonstrate how restricting the length of ROLs or introducing unbal-
ancedness can affect the size of the core we present two extreme examples
where we have tried to minimize the effect of ROL restrictions. By conver-
gence, we mean how the matching produced by COSM comes closer to SOSM
by setwise inclusions measured by the number of newly similarly matched pairs
under the two algorithms. To clarify, let the set of applicants and programs
that are matched to the same pairs under COSM and SOSM in the unrestricted
ROL case be denoted by Z0 and similarly when there is a restriction of one on
ROLs by Z1. By stability it holds that Z0 ∈ Z1 and the rate of convergence
is |Z1| − |Z0|. Moreover, the set z1 = Z1\Z0 includes the new pairs that are
now matched with the same partner under the two algorithms when the ROL
restriction is in place.
Example 1. Strict preferences for a balanced market form the following Con-
dorcet cycle are displayed below. For applicants the cycle starts from the most
preferred choice while for the programs it is simply reversed horizontally. All
programs have a quota of one and the market is balanced with k > 1 agents on
both sides. The preferences and priorities are displayed below. To clarify, for
an applicant s1 the preferences are ≺s1 : c1, c2, ..., ck−2, ck−1, ck, s1.
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≺s1 ≺s2 ≺s3 . . . ≺sk−2 ≺sk−1 ≺sk
c1 ck ck−1 · · · c4 c3 c2
c2 c1 ck · · · c5 c4 c3
c3 c2 c1 · · · c6 c5 c4
...
...
... · · · ... ... ...
ck−2 ck−3 ck−4 · · · c1 ck ck−1
ck−1 ck−2 ck−3 · · · c2 c1 ck
ck ck−1 ck−2 · · · c3 c2 c1
≺c1 ≺c2 ≺c3 . . . ≺ck−2 ≺ck−1 ≺ck
s2 s3 s4 · · · sk−1 sk s1
s3 s4 s5 · · · sk s1 s2
s4 s5 s6 · · · s1 s2 s3
...
...
... · · · ... ... ...
sk−1 sk s1 · · · sk−4 sk−3 sk−2
sk s1 s2 · · · sk−3 sk−2 sk−1
s1 s2 s3 · · · sk−2 sk−1 sk
Suppose that there is a restriction of n on the length of ROLs, and applicants
can apply to k − n programs each. It follows that at least 2n applicants are
matched to their most preferred pair (naturally up to market size k). If k is odd,
there are 2n + 1 applicants matched to their most preferred pair. In addition,
the rate of convergence to a singleton core remains constant when the length of
ROLs is restricted further. With a ROL restriction of n, the average rank of
applicants matched to programs is n + 1. When k > 1 COSM converges by a
rate of two. That is, by further restricting the length of applicants’ ROLs by
one, two more applicant-program pairs are matched the same under SOSM and
COSM. This example is a special case of a preference structure where the rate
of convergence to a singleton core is constant.
To illustrate how restricting ROL length affects the core size let us look an
example where n = 3 and k = 7. The first ROL restriction is marked with a
slash, second with a backslash, and the third with a cross. When there are no
restriction on ROLs in place we have Z0 = {s5− c4}. Note that when n = 1 we
have Z1 = {(s5 − c4), (s2 − c7), (s6 − c3)} and z1 = {(s2 − c7), (s6 − c3)}.
≺s1 ≺s2 ≺s3 ≺s4 ≺s5 ≺s6 ≺s7
c1 c7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2
c2 c1 c7 c6 c5 c4 c3
c3 c2 c1 c7 c6 c5 c4
c4 c3 c2 c1 c7 c6 c5
Zc5 Zc4 Zc3 Zc2 Zc1 Zc7 Zc6
Zc6 Zc5 Zc4 Zc3 Zc2 Zc1 Zc7
c7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1
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≺c1 ≺c2 ≺c3 ≺c4 ≺c5 ≺c6 ≺c7
s2 s3 Zs4 s5 s6 Zs7 s1
s3 Zs4 s5 s6 s7 Zs1 s2
s4 Zs5 s6 s7 Zs1 s2 s3
Zs5 s6 s7 s1 Zs2 s3 s4
Zs6 s7 s1 Zs2 s3 s4 s5
s7 s1 s2 Zs3 s4 s5 Zs6
s1 s2 Zs3 s4 s5 s6 Zs7
When n = 3 the set Z3 produced by COSM has the same applicant-program
pairs as matching µ produce by SOSM. That is, the core is a singleton and the
average rank of applicants matched to programs is four. After this example, it
should be clear that a constant convergence rate is a special case; typically the
more competition there is among the programs in each round, the higher the
rate of convergence. 
Remark 1. A careful reader has already induced that the matching µ produced
by SOSM under the ROL restriction of n can be generally written down as a
partition of pairs produced by COSM under the iterative ROL restrictions:
µSOSM = Z
0 ∪ z1 ∪ · · · ∪ zn = Zn,
where n is bound to allow ROL length of at least 1. In our example we have
n < k.
The next example shows why we should not report just the number of dif-
ferently allocated agents, but also the average ranks of matched agents under
COSM and SOSM. Furthermore, it shows why in some instances a short ROL
by a single agent can dominate the entire matching to produce a singleton core.
Example 2. Suppose that strict preferences form two distinct Condorcet cycles:
for applicants it starts from the first applicant’s most preferred program and
moves towards the least preferred program – for programs it starts from the
least preferred applicant of the first program moving upwards and to the right.
That is, for programs the priorities are simply moved left by one column. The
market is balanced with k applicants and programs. Each program has a quota
of one. The preferences and priorities are shown below.
≺s1 ≺s2 ≺s3 . . . ≺sk−2 ≺sk−1 ≺sk
c1 ck ck−1 · · · c4 c3 c2
c2 c1 ck · · · c5 c4 c3
c3 c2 c1 · · · c6 c5 c4
...
...
... · · · ... ... ...
ck−2 ck−3 ck−4 · · · c1 ck ck−1
ck−1 ck−2 ck−3 · · · c2 c1 ck
ck ck−1 ck−2 · · · c3 c2 c1
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≺c1 ≺c2 ≺c3 . . . ≺ck−2 ≺ck−1 ≺ck
sk sk−1 sk−2 · · · s3 s2 s1
sk−1 sk−2 sk−3 · · · s2 s1 sk
sk−2 sk−3 sk−4 · · · s1 sk sk−1
...
...
... · · · ... ... ...
s3 s2 s1 · · · s6 s5 s4
s2 s1 sk · · · s5 s4 s3
s1 sk sk−1 · · · s4 s3 s2
It is straightforward to see that SOSM would produce a matching where all
applicants are matched to their most preferred program and all programs would
be matched to their least preferred applicant. Similarly for COSM, programs
would get the most preferred applicants and applicants would be matched to
their least preferred programs.
If there is a restriction of length n on the length of the ROLs for the ap-
plicants, this would result in omitting k − n top choices for programs. Again,
SOSM and COSM would match the proposal side with the best possible match
when the ROL restriction is in place. Thus, even when the length of the ROLs
would be limited to just two, matchings produced by COSM and SOSM would
not contain any common pairs. However, the average rank of the applicants
matched to programs is very low compared to the unrestricted case. Further-
more, there is no difference between the average rank of applicants matched
to programs under COSM and SOSM when the ROL restrictions are in place
illustrating that the core is indeed very small.
The core can shrink to a singleton even when the market is balanced and no
restrictions on the length of the ROLs are set. To see this, suppose applicant
sk falsely reports his preferences such that only his most preferred program c2
is acceptable. This would result COSM to run for k(k − 1) + 1 rounds, only to
produce the exact same matching as SOSM. Clearly, the chaining of rejections
and later proposals can have a dramatic effect on the size of the core. 
6 Empirical results
We start by comparing the extreme COSM and SOSM matchings using the
clearinghouse data. Summaries of matchings produced by COSM, SOSM, as
well as by running a Top Trading Cycles algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) on
top of the COSM matching are shown in Table 3. All algorithms are described
in the appendix. Panel (1) shows properties of our replication of the actual
matching. As we have seen before, less than a third of applicants receive a
slot in each of the three years. The values of r¯C show that programs accept
applicants which they rank about 56th among their applicants on average, but
this number is hard to interpret without further context. The grade-based
program ranking r¯C(GPA) shows the ranking among all applicants ranging from
one to the total number of applicants. This measure is easier to interpret, and
seems quite high, much closer to their average rank of all applicants than to the
average rank of the top one third of applicants. On the other hand, r¯S seems
quite low, close to its theoretical minimum of 1. Especially the high program
rankings seem surprising given the large number of applicants per slot.
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Table 3: A comparison of matchings under COSM and two alternative mecha-
nisms
2011 2012 2013
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 16655 16425 15210
(1) COSM
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
r¯C 55.54 55.88 56.19
r¯C(GPA) 17915.90 17924.99 17347.49
r¯S 1.27 1.27 1.25
(2) SOSM
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
applicants better off 0 2 0
applicants worse off 0 0 0
r¯C 55.54 55.88 56.19
r¯C(GPA) 17915.90 17924.50 17347.49
r¯S 1.27 1.27 1.25
(3) COSM + Trade
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
applicants better off 149 181 172
applicants worse off 0 0 0
envious applicants 9448 10371 10147
r¯C 56.92 57.52 57.89
r¯C(GPA) 17919.34 17935.34 17351.76
r¯S 1.26 1.26 1.23
COSM, SOSM, and a Top Trading Cycles algorithm run on top of COSM produce similar
matchings when run on empirical data. Justifiably envious applicants is a measure of how
many applicants can form a blocking pair
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Panel (2) shows the results of running SOSM on the same data. In two out
of three years, SOSM produces exactly the same matching as COSM, while two
applicants switch programs in the third. As a consequence, mean rankings are
almost exactly the same across the two matchings within each year. Note how
the grade-based mean program ranking, r¯C(GPA), counter-intuitively improves
slightly under SOSM during year 2012. This is because the grade-based ranking
is an imperfect proxy of the composite score used in the matching.
In Panel (3) we show the results of a Top Trading Cycles algorithm run
on top of the COSM matching. Allowing applicants to trade their COSM-
allocated slots with each other makes less than two hundred applicants better
off in each year, but at the cost of about 10000 applicants’ justified envy. From
the programs’ perspective, trading reduces match quality, but only by a few
rankings out of approximately 50000. Mean applicant rankings are similarly
improved by 0.01 to 0.02 rankings on average.
In Table 4 we show comparisons of COSM and SOSM matchings using the
clearinghouse data, but with different adjustments made to the data. Panel (1)
summarizes the first two panels of Table 3, with the COSM and SOSM match-
ings being identical to each other in two out of three years, and near-identical in
2012. In Panel (2), we replace program priorities with completely randomized
priorities. COSM still produces the same matching as SOSM in two out of three
years, with two applicants switching programs in 2011. Program rankings im-
prove from about 55 to about 41 and the average applicant ranking deteriorates
to about 2. The GPA-based program rankings are not informative in this spec-
ification, since grades are now uncorrelated with the program priorities used in
the matching.
In Panel (3), we multiply the number of slots in each program by a fixed
factor in such a way that the total number of slots equals the total number
of applicants. This balances the market. Because applicants only apply to a
limited number of slots, about a fifth of the slots remain unallocated in this
specification. In all three years, COSM produces the same matching as SOSM.
The average rankings of programs are only slightly better than random in this
specification, while applicants’ average rankings are even better than in the
original matching.
In Table 5, we pad applicants’ ROLs with the complete set of programs
the applicants did not originally apply to added in random order. Since we
do not have composite scores for programs applicants did not apply to, we
instead use their field-specific matriculation exam GPAs to construct program
preferences. A comparison of Panels (1) and (2) shows the effect of swapping out
the composite-score based preference with the GPA-based one, while in Panel (3)
we have also padded the ROLs to full length. The COSM matchings are identical
to the SOSM matchings under grade-based program priorities in Panel (2), while
they only differ marginally from each other when every student applies to every
single program in Panel (3). The values of r¯C,COSM and r¯C,SOSM show that
match quality deteriorates for programs when taking program preferences at face
value. This is to be expected since program preferences become more correlated
in this specification compared to the baseline. It is however also notable how
much match quality improves when we compare the values of r¯C,COSM(GPA)
and r¯C,SOSM(GPA) across panels. Part of the reason baseline programs are
matched to such a bad selection of applicants in terms of GPA under the baseline
matching is because they in practice do not end up selecting on it very strongly,
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Table 4: Core size, deviations from empirical data (Part I).
2011 2012 2013
(1) Original matching
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 0 2 0
r¯C,COSM 55.54 55.88 56.19
r¯C,SOSM 55.54 55.88 56.19
r¯C,COSM(GPA) 17915.90 17924.99 17347.49
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) 17915.90 17924.50 17347.49
r¯S,COSM 1.27 1.27 1.25
r¯S,SOSM 1.27 1.27 1.25
(2) Random program priorities
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 2 0 0
r¯C,COSM 41.81 41.67 40.16
r¯C,SOSM 41.81 41.67 40.16
r¯C,COSM(GPA) N/A N/A N/A
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) N/A N/A N/A
r¯S,COSM 1.94 1.96 1.97
r¯S,SOSM 1.94 1.96 1.97
(3) One slot per applicant
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 40101 40368 42112
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 192.47 199.24 222.47
r¯C,SOSM 192.47 199.24 222.47
r¯C,COSM(GPA) 23204.94 23283.02 24019.45
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) 23204.94 23283.02 24019.45
r¯S,COSM 1.21 1.21 1.20
r¯S,SOSM 1.21 1.21 1.20
Original matching is the empirical matching produced by COSM and the One slot per appli-
cant is a specification where the market is balanced.
but instead also select on whether the applicant takes the entry exam, and
whether the applicant listed the program first on his ROL. For the same reason,
match quality deteriorates for applicants in specification (2) as well if we take
the applicants’ ROLs at face value.
Effectively forcing each applicant to apply to each program in Panel (3)
causes a large improvement in match quality from the programs’ perspective.
Mean applicant ranks deteriorate because applicants previously unmatched are
now accepted by other programs, and to a lesser degree because the applicants
they replaced are themselves re-matched at programs they prefer less. Applicant
welfare is however hard to evaluate since different applicants are accepted into
programs than under the baseline.
In Appendix A Table 8, we replicate Tables 4 and 5 , but with actual ROLs
replaced with ROLs consisting of independent random draws from the set of all
programs available in each year. Because exact program priorities are not known
for counterfactual applications, we replace program priorities with grade-based
priorities in all specifications, except for the specification in which program pri-
orities are drawn randomly. The core is now a singleton in all specifications, and
just like before, program and applicant mean ranks are affected in the expected
directions and similar magnitudes when removing the correlation between pro-
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Table 5: Core size, deviations from empirical data (Part II).
2011 2012 2013
(1) Original matching
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 0 2 0
r¯C,COSM 55.54 55.88 56.19
r¯C,SOSM 55.54 55.88 56.19
r¯C,COSM(GPA) 17915.90 17924.99 17347.49
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) 17915.90 17924.50 17347.49
r¯S,COSM 1.27 1.27 1.25
r¯S,SOSM 1.27 1.27 1.25
(2) Grade-based program priorities
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 71.29 71.51 71.34
r¯C,SOSM 71.29 71.51 71.34
r¯C,COSM(GPA) 9992.65 9923.47 9006.37
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) 9992.65 9923.47 9006.37
r¯S,COSM 1.49 1.49 1.49
r¯S,SOSM 1.49 1.49 1.49
(3) Full length ROL
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 4 6 0
r¯C,COSM 5667.89 5555.64 5046.56
r¯C,SOSM 5668.02 5556.29 5046.56
r¯C,COSM(GPA) 5667.89 5555.64 5046.56
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) 5668.02 5556.29 5046.56
r¯S,COSM 8.72 8.39 8.57
r¯S,SOSM 8.72 8.39 8.57
Original matching is the empirical matching produced by COSM and the Grade-based pro-
gram priorities means common program priorities within a study field. Full length ROL uses
the empirical ROLs and adds random preferences such that all programs are acceptable for
applicants
gram preferences, balancing the market, or simulating full-length ROLs. This
suggests that our results are not an artifact of any specific pattern in submitted
ROLs.
In summary, the core is commonly a singleton in the clearinghouse data, and
remains typically a singleton when we replace program priorities with random-
ized, uncorrelated priorities, when we balance the market, and when we force
each applicant to apply to each program. In spite of the extreme unbalanced-
ness of the market, programs are matched to applicants who are on average not
much better in terms of matriculation grades than if they would be matched
with randomly drawn applicants. This can be explained both by the low num-
ber of programs each applicant applies to, and to the lack of selection on grades
that programs seem to exercise in the first place.
The above results suggest that policy changes of a realistic magnitude are not
sufficient to create substantial differences between COSM and SOSM matchings.
This poses the question of how large policy changes would have to be to produce
a substantial difference. For this purpose, we simulate an higher education
market where the numbers of applicants and programs is equal to those in the
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clearinghouse dataset, but programs are equally large, the market is balanced,
ROLs are complete, and preferences are completely independent random draws.
The first panel of Table 6, shows characteristics of the COSM and SOSM
matchings on the simulated market. All applicants are matched to a pro-
gram, and almost all applicants are matched to different programs under SOSM
than under SOSM. Differences in rankings are large too, with programs being
matched to much more preferred applicants under COSM, and applicants being
matched to much more preferred applicants under SOSM. Since they are inde-
pendently drawn, the correlation ρ between the different programs’ priorities
over applicants is 0 in this specification.
In Panel (2), we change program quota to be proportional to real quota of
the programs, leaving the total number of slots unchanged from Panel (1). The
correlation is however still very close to zero. All applicants are still matched
but the average rank for applicants rises. This is due to the fact that small and
large programs receive applications with equal probability. As can be seen from
the table, this matching is favorable to the programs in terms of average ranks.
In Panel (3) we restore the uniform program sizes, but change how we draw
program priorities so that they are perfectly correlated within field, but uncor-
related across fields. This increases the mean pairwise correlation of priorities
between programs to 0.21. Though fewer applicants are now allocated differently
between the two extreme stable matchings, their numbers still are substantial.
Because program priorities are correlated with field in this specification, pro-
gram rankings are substantially higher than in the previous specification, and
applicant rankings substantially lower.
In Panel (4) we replace the simulated program priorities with the empirical
ones. The mean pairwise correlation between programs is about 0.86 in the
clearinghouse data. The much lower correlation in Panel (3) illustrates that
the high empirical correlation is to a large extent due to correlated priorities
across fields. Applicants are even better off than before, and programs are
matched to applicants which they do not prefer substantially more than had
they been selected at random. The number of differently allocated applicants
is moderately small, and applicants are on average at most a few hundreds of
ranks better off under SOSM than under COSM. For programs, the difference
in average rankings is negligible between the algorithms.
In Table 7 we gradually remove slots from the balanced market of our simu-
lated data set. As can be seen from a comparison of Panels (1) and (2), the core
shrinks substantially even for a reduction of as little as 0.1% of the total number
of slots in the market. This amounts to a mere 51 to 53 removed slots. Dif-
ferences in mean rankings between the algorithms disappear almost completely.
Applicants are on average substantially worse off than on the balanced market,
and programs are substantially better off, regardless of algorithm.
Further reducing the number of slots to 99% of the number of applicants
in Panel (3), and then to 90% of the number of applicants in Panel (4) further
reduces the number of differently allocated applicants between algorithms, and
improves program mean rankings at the expense of applicant rankings. Our sim-
ulations confirm the findings of Ashlagi et al. (2017) that even a small imbalance
in the market can drive the core close to a singleton.
We next analyze the effect of restricting the length of ROLs on the size of
the core. As stated by Ashlagi et al. (2017), restrictions on the length of the
ROLs can be seen as introduction of indirect unbalancedness to the market.
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Table 6: Core size, deviations from a simulated market.
2011 2012 2013
(1) Baseline
ρ 0.00 0.00 0.00
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 49328 49444 50967
r¯C,COSM 602.71 614.00 685.49
r¯C,SOSM 20104.28 20037.30 20723.16
r¯S,COSM 42.37 41.61 38.58
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.28
(2) Unequally sized programs
ρ 0.00 0.00 0.00
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 37103 36285 37484
r¯C,COSM 1182.78 1266.68 1387.45
r¯C,SOSM 4371.85 4398.77 4805.15
r¯S,COSM 39.34 36.48 33.83
r¯S,SOSM 10.51 10.49 9.79
(3) Grouped program priorities
ρ 0.21 0.21 0.23
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 10511 8255 7292
r¯C,COSM 17253.50 17959.65 18977.83
r¯C,SOSM 21308.51 21118.09 21667.16
r¯S,COSM 1.77 1.65 1.64
r¯S,SOSM 1.27 1.29 1.32
(4) Grade-based program priorities
ρ 0.86 0.86 0.87
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 197 51 8
r¯C,COSM 25178.94 25230.71 26081.85
r¯C,SOSM 25186.70 25232.35 26082.23
r¯S,COSM 1.32 1.33 1.28
r¯S,SOSM 1.25 1.30 1.28
Unequally sized programs means that the market is balanced but the number of slots in
each program is grown proportionally relative to their original size. Grouped program
priorities stands for identical program priorities within a study field. In Grade-based
program priorities the simulated program priorities are changed back to the empirical
ones. Correlation within program priorities is denoted by ρ
Hence, one can expect ROL restrictions to affect the size of the core as we saw
in Section 5.
Simulations using random uniform preferences in a balanced market are
shown for different length ROLs in Figures 1 and 2. Slightly restricting the
length of ROLs has a milder effect on the size of the core than slightly unbalanced
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Table 7: Core size, deviations from a balanced market with uniform preferences.
2011 2012 2013
(1) Baseline
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 49328 49444 50967
r¯C,COSM 602.71 614.00 685.49
r¯C,SOSM 20104.28 20037.30 20723.16
r¯S,COSM 42.37 41.61 38.58
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.28
(2) 0.999 slots per applicant
slots 50843 50928 52612
slots 50843 50928 52612
filled slots 50843 50928 52612
differently allocated applicants 153 13 87
r¯C,COSM 402.31 401.70 461.24
r¯C,SOSM 403.53 401.80 462.08
r¯S,COSM 63.52 63.84 57.12
r¯S,SOSM 63.33 63.82 57.04
(3) 0.99 slots per applicant
slots 50385 50469 52138
slots 50385 50469 52138
filled slots 50385 50469 52138
differently allocated applicants 23 10 2
r¯C,COSM 267.03 275.46 309.46
r¯C,SOSM 267.14 275.51 309.47
r¯S,COSM 91.96 89.45 81.95
r¯S,SOSM 91.92 89.43 81.95
(4) 0.90 slots per applicant
slots 45804 45881 47398
slots 45804 45881 47398
filled slots 45804 45881 47398
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 134.01 136.36 154.65
r¯C,SOSM 134.01 136.36 154.65
r¯S,COSM 142.81 140.24 129.08
r¯S,SOSM 142.81 140.24 129.08
(5) Original unbalancedness
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 23.48 23.65 23.24
r¯C,SOSM 23.48 23.65 23.24
r¯S,COSM 206.45 202.85 188.62
r¯S,SOSM 206.45 202.85 188.62
0.999 slots per applicant stands for removing 0.1%, 0.99 slots per applicant for remov-
ing 1%, and 0.90 slots per applicant for removing 10% of slots from program capaci-
ties. In Original unbalancedness, the number of slots per applicant is approximately
one third varying for each year
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markets. A notable relative change occurs after the length of ROLs is smaller
than 50. However, the most radical change occurs after we restrict the length
from 10 to the maximal length of 4 of the original application process4. The
average rank of applicants matched to programs increases significantly from
the baseline of approximately 600 to 22 000 when the length of the ROLs is
restricted to four. Thus, programs get worse matches in terms of average ranks
when the ROL lengths are restricted heavily.
ROL length
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Figure 1: Number of differently allocated applicants under COSM and SOSM
as a function of ROL length for each year
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Figure 2: Number of differently allocated applicants under COSM and SOSM
with ROL lengths of one to ten for each year
In summary, the empirical correlation of program priorities reduces the size
4Additional simulation results of various ROL length changes are found in Appendix A
Table 9.
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of the core substantially, even if the core is not a singleton in any of the three
years. It further improves applicant outcomes at the cost of program outcomes,
especially in the college-optimal matching. Additionally, the unbalancedness
of the market dramatically reduces the size of the core. Average ranks for
programs tend to decrease while average ranks for applicants tend to increase
as the unbalancedness becomes more severe. Finally, limiting the length of
ROLs reduces the size of the core dramatically.
7 Discussion
In the literature, it is sometimes suggested that it is beyond question that schools
are there for the students, and not the other way around. If so, it is hard to
see that COSM would ever be preferable to SOSM. It can however also be
argued that school preferences at times reflect social preferences on who should
be admitted where, especially when school preferences are based on government
laws and regulations. Under such circumstances, the policy maker faces a real
trade-off in weighing the student’s wishes against those of society.
Under idealized circumstances, with independently drawn preferences, a bal-
anced market, and long ROLs, the difference between SOSM and COSM match-
ings can be large. This suggests that the choice between SOSM and COSM
matchings can have policy relevance. In this paper, we however find that the
differences between COSM and SOSM matchings are negligible in Finnish poly-
technic applications. We mainly contribute this result to the unbalancedness of
the market (see Ashlagi et al., 2017), but also to the low number of programs
Finnish applicants each apply to, as well as to the correlation between program
preferences.
Correlated preferences, unbalanced markets and short ROLs are ubiquitous
in real application systems, and conditional on submitted preferences the choice
between the COSM and SOSM matchings themselves is likely to be trivial under
most circumstances. The policy maker should thus concentrate on other design
aspects of the application system. SOSM may for example be preferred to
COSM in order to discourage applicants from trying to strategize.
The similarity of SOSM and COSM matchings does however not imply that
a trade-off between student and school preferences does not exist. Even though
Finnish polytechnics jointly accept less than a third of applicants each year, we
find that the average quality of accepted applicants in terms of matriculation
grades is not much better than of the median applicant. At the same time, a
majority of accepted applicants get accepted to their most preferred program,
even when we randomize applicant preferences. Programs’ low match quality
is a direct consequence of the low number of programs applicants each apply
to. Policies such as giving extra points for the first listed choice, or requiring
applicants to take separate entry exams for the programs they wish to apply
to, have the effect of further restricting the effective ROL length, and may thus
have the side effect of reducing programs’ match quality while redistributing
slots between students in a manner that may or may not be intended. We argue
that the policy maker would do well to take the trade-off between student and
school preferences more explicitly into account when designing the application
process.
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A Algorithms and Tables
In order to facilitate replication of our results, we describe the matching algo-
rithms used in the paper. The descriptions are modified such that they follow
more closely the actual simulation code used rather than the common theoretical
presentation type of describing the algorithms.
College-optimal stable mechanism (COSM)
Each program has a quota of qj slots.
Step 1: each program proposes to its qj most preferred applicants.
Applicants each tentatively accept their most preferred proposal.
Other proposals are rejected.
Step k: each program proposes to a number of their most preferred
remaining applicants equal to the number of rejections it has re-
ceived during the previous round. If the program has less remaining
applicants to propose to than its number of rejections, it proposes
to all remaining applicants. Applicants each tentatively accept their
most preferred proposal. Other proposals are rejected.
The algorithm ends when no more proposals are rejected, and every
applicant is permanently accepts his last assignment.
Though this algorithm runs relatively efficiently in terms of computing time
since programs can each propose to up to qj applicants in each round, for large
numbers of applicants applying to a large number of programs, the algorithm
still spends unnecessary time chasing small numbers of rejection chains through
the full data set. We have found that adapting the algorithm to iteratively
run on subsets of the full preference tables can yield performance improvements
of orders of magnitude for large data sets, intuitively because it allows the
computer to resolve more rejection chains simultaneously in each step.
College-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) for large data sets
Step 1.0: consider only each program’s α · qj most preferred appli-
cants, with α ≥ 1. If the number of applicants is smaller than α · qj
for any program, include all applicants for that program.
Step 1.1: each program proposes to its qj most preferred applicants.
Applicants each tentatively accept their most preferred proposal.
Other proposals are rejected.
Step 1.`: each program proposes to a number of their most preferred
remaining applicants equal to the number of rejections it received
during the previous round. If the program has less remaining appli-
cants to propose to than the number of rejections, it proposes to the
remaining applicants. Applicants each tentatively accept their most
preferred proposal. Other proposals are rejected.
Step 1 ends when no more proposals are rejected within this subset
of preferences.
Step k.0: From the full preference tables, consider only each pro-
gram’s α · qj most preferred applicants that have not rejected that
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program yet. If the number of such applicants is smaller than α · qj
for any program, include all remaining applicants for that program.
Step k.1: each program proposes to a number applicants equal to its
current number of unfilled slots. Applicants each tentatively accept
their most preferred proposal. Other proposals are rejected.
Step k.`: each program proposes to a number of their most preferred
remaining applicants equal to the number of rejections it received
during the previous round. If the program has less remaining appli-
cants to propose to than the number of rejections, it proposes to the
remaining applicants. Applicants each tentatively accept their most
preferred proposal. Other proposals are rejected.
Step k ends when no more proposals are rejected within its subset
of preferences.
The algorithm ends when all slots have been tentatively filled or all
possible proposals have been made.
The optimal α is a trade-off between the computing time used to select a
new subset of preferences in steps k.0, and the additional time that is needed
for steps k.` when run on a larger subset. A larger α reduces the number of i
steps needed, but increases the number of j steps within each i step. In settings
where we simulate outcomes where every single applicant applies to every single
program, and the number of applications to each program is substantially larger
than its quota, we find that our algorithm runs quickest with an α of about 1.6.
Student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM)
Step 1: each applicant proposes to his first choice. Each program
tentatively accepts a number of applicants equal to its quota. Other
proposals are marked as rejected.
Step k: each rejected applicant proposes to his first remaining choice.
Each program tentatively accepts a total number of applicants equal
to its quota. Other proposals are marked as rejected.
The algorithm ends when no more proposals are rejected, and every
applicant is permanently assigned to his last tentative assignment.
SOSM is less problematic to run on large data sets with small to moderate
numbers of programs since a number of proposals up to the number of applicants
can be processed in each step, and the total number of steps is reduced by the
more limited total number of programs. Even if it would in theory be possible
to iteratively subset preferences in the same way as as with COSM, we have not
attempted to do so in practice.
We do adapt a top trading cycles algorithm to run faster by letting it look
for cycles on the program level rather than on the individual level.
Top trading cycles after COSM (COSM + Trade)
Tentatively assign each applicant to his COSM matching. Make the
assignment of applicants who have received no slot permanent since
no other applicants will want to trade with them. Consider only the
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remaining, tentatively assigned applicants. Also create an arbitrary
random variable ε which contains a unique value for each applicant.
Cycle step 1: within the programs that applicants have been tenta-
tively (but not permanently) assigned to at this point, let all appli-
cants point to the program they prefer most. If there are any ap-
plicants pointing to the program they have already been tentatively
assigned to, permanently assign these applicants to those programs
and continue with the cleanup step. Otherwise continue with the
next cycle step.
Cycle step 2: aggregate pointers to the program level, and find out
if there are any cycles of length 2 on the program level, i.e. for
all combinations of programs cj and c−j , how many applicants are
tentatively assigned to program c−j but prefer cj and vice versa.
For each combination of programs for which both numbers are pos-
itive, take the minimum of the two numbers of potential switchers
nswitchers. Then permanently assign the nswitchers potential switch-
ers who have the lowest value of ε in either program to the program
she would like to switch to. If any cycle was found, continue to the
cleanup step. Otherwise continue with the next cycle step.
Cycle step k: find out if there are any cycles of length k on the
program level. Within each cycle, take the minimum of switchers
that want to switch from one program to the next, and permanently
assign that number of applicants with the lowest values of ε to their
preferred program. If any cycle was found, continue to the cleanup
step. Otherwise continue with the next cycle step.
Cleanup step: remove permanently assigned applicants from the ap-
plicants under consideration. If all applicants are permanently as-
signed, the algorithm ends. If not, return to cycle step 1.
Table 8 shows the effects of the same specifications from Tables 4 and 5, but
for random ROLs for applicants and grade-based priorities for programs with
the average ranking ranging from one to the total number of applicants |S|. The
core is a singleton in each case.
Table 9 shows the simulations when the length of ROLs differs from the
maximum. The preferences on both sides of the market are completely uncor-
related and the market is balanced. As we saw from Figures 1 and 2, the core
converges to a singleton when the ROL restriction comes closer to the real world
case. Note that the average rankings for programs are surprisingly high; when
the ROL lengths are of original length for each applicant, programs on average
get matched to applicants it ranks as good as random applicants.
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Table 8: Robustness checks of Tables 4 and 5
2011 2012 2013
(1) Baseline: grade-based program priorities
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16494 16291 15122
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 9215.94 9347.31 8650.62
r¯C,SOSM 9215.94 9347.31 8650.62
r¯S,COSM 1.49 1.49 1.47
r¯S,SOSM 1.49 1.49 1.47
(2) Random program priorities
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16496 16291 15123
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 5924.58 5984.92 5569.14
r¯C,SOSM 5924.58 5984.92 5569.14
r¯C,COSM(GPA) N/A N/A N/A
r¯C,SOSM(GPA) N/A N/A N/A
r¯S,COSM 1.97 1.96 1.97
r¯S,SOSM 1.97 1.96 1.97
(3) One slot per applicant
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 42777 42697 44107
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 21943.82 21967.34 22660.95
r¯C,SOSM 21943.82 21967.34 22660.95
r¯S,COSM 1.32 1.32 1.31
r¯S,SOSM 1.32 1.32 1.31
(5) Full length ROL
slots 16655 16425 15210
filled slots 16655 16425 15210
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 5643.28 5521.54 5051.09
r¯C,SOSM 5643.28 5521.54 5051.09
r¯S,COSM 13.36 14.12 13.39
r¯S,SOSM 13.36 14.12 13.39
Core size for random applicant preferences and grade-based priorities for the
programs with specifications similar to those in Table 4. Average ranks are
measured from one to to the total number of applicants
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Table 9: Core size and varying ROL lengths
2011 2012 2013
(1) Full length
applicants 50894 50979 52665
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 49328 49444 50967
r¯C,COSM 602.71 614.00 685.49
r¯C,SOSM 20104.28 20037.30 20723.16
r¯S,COSM 42.37 41.61 38.58
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.28
(2) ROL length: 200
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 47026 47270 48798
r¯C,COSM 1529.72 1477.56 1549.07
r¯C,SOSM 20194.22 20193.04 21047.96
r¯S,COSM 16.89 17.28 17.10
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.26
(3) ROL length: 100
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 43395 44558 44363
r¯C,COSM 2946.64 2529.92 3326.33
r¯C,SOSM 20194.22 20193.04 21047.96
r¯S,COSM 8.76 10.15 7.90
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.26
(4) ROL length: 50
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 38726 39412 40541
r¯C,COSM 4839.49 4561.87 4861.77
r¯C,SOSM 20194.22 20193.04 21047.96
r¯S,COSM 5.32 5.63 5.42
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.26
(5) ROL length: 10
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50894 50979 52665
differently allocated applicants 3175 8520 8643
r¯C,COSM 18927.84 16810.61 17608.57
r¯C,SOSM 20194.22 20193.04 21047.96
r¯S,COSM 1.36 1.53 1.51
r¯S,SOSM 1.28 1.28 1.26
(6) ROL length: 4
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50856 50942 52633
differently allocated applicants 2 35 5
r¯C,COSM 21718.15 21566.17 22335.27
r¯C,SOSM 21719.27 21579.26 22336.98
r¯S,COSM 1.18 1.19 1.18
r¯S,SOSM 1.18 1.19 1.18
(7) ROL length: Original length
slots 50894 50979 52665
filled slots 50061 50242 51867
differently allocated applicants 0 0 0
r¯C,COSM 23765.64 24014.70 24784.81
r¯C,SOSM 23765.64 24014.70 24784.81
r¯S,COSM 1.06 1.06 1.05
r¯S,SOSM 1.06 1.06 1.05
Original length stands for the actual ROL length of each applicant
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